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<The Councillor as Guardian of the Environment> Part II - Workshop on the Councillor as Guardian of
the Environment WORKSHOP COMPONENTS 13.19 Case Study: LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHERS
These two case studies are to help participants interpret the implications of starkly contrasted results from the implementation of public-inspired policy in two situations, each with high potential for improvement of the local urban environment.
Divide participants into several small groups. Provide half of the small groups with copies of the first case called Integrated Planning for a Sustainable Curitiba, one copy per participant. Provide the other small groups with copies of the second case, Lost Opportunity in Los Belvederes. Ask participants to read their respective cases. After reading their cases, tell each group to discuss as a group and answer the ques-tions that follow the cases. After small groups have answered the questions at the end of the cases and printed their answers on newsprint, have them reassemble to report and discuss their results. First, have each of the groups assigned the Curitiba to report and discuss their answers to the case questions. Follow this with reports from each group assigned the Los Belvederes case. When all groups have reported, encourage reflection and discussion of the lessons learned from the two cases with another question: What lessons from the Curitiba case might have been used to good advantage by the government of Mexico City in the Los Belvederes case? Ask participants, in answering the question, to think about the implications of public policy implementation, pro and con, for the achieve-ment of sustainability in urban areas. What should local governments do and not do? Provide ample opportunity for discussion and sharing of points of view.
The situation In twenty years, Curitiba has become not only one of Brazil's most livable cities but also a model of how simple methods can be used to resolve or prevent seemingly overwhelming problems. Curitiba is the capital of the farm-belt state of Paran in the South of Brazil. Experiencing the rapid urbanization characteristic of Brazil in the seventies, Curitiba, Brazil's tenth largest city, nearly doubled in population from 900,000 in 1970 to 1.6 million in 1980. The growth is attributed largely to the migration of people from rural areas and other regions in search of work in Curitiba's industries. Curitiba had the highest growth rate among metropolitan regions in Brazil during this period resulting in a population density increase from 1,343 to 2,380 people per square km. The challenge to city government during this growth period has been to guide population and economic growth so that social, physical, economic, and environmental characteristics of the city are not compromised. The management of urban growth began in the mid-sixties with the preparation of Curitiba's master plan. The plan called for the integration of traffic management, transportation and land-use planning to support the plan's strategic objectives. These objectives were intended to:
Curitiba's lofty urban objectives have been supported by planning and policies structured so that land-use planners and transportation planners are working and developing plans together. The result has been an extraordinary example of plans being translated into programmes that work. A major emphasis of land-use development has been the concentration of new development in existing urban space instead of sprawling outward as it does in most cities. Planners encourage higher densities around major transport corridors and ensure that each area includes a mix of homes, jobs, and services. For example, "structural axes" crossing the city were laid out with adjacent areas designated for high-density, mixed-use development to achieve densities capable of supporting the operation of public transit systems on these axes. The structural axes have become the foundation for an extensive citywide bus transportation system. According to Curitiba's popular mayor, Jaime Lerner, "the trick of transit is to integrate the various forms of transportation, from buses to boats to subway to bicycle." Curitiba has successfully done what many other cities want to imitate: harmonize the differing routes and vehicles of mass transportation. The city recently modernized its express bus system, creating attractive and comfortable transfer stations. Passengers can travel from one structural axes of the city to another without the need to travel into the city center. Interdistrict routes carry passengers to integration terminals on the structural axes to permit full integration of feeder and express bus lines. High ridership has permitted closing downtown streets to automobile use and the creation of large pedestrian areas and the revival of historic districts. The downtown area is laced with city parks, and a 90-mile bicycle path has been constructed to accommodate both leisure and commuting. Consistent with Mayor Lerner's philosophy that the bicycle is a vital part of "urban transportation," the city has an extensive bicycle path network. Pedestrians have priority in the down-town area, public squares have been improved, and regularly scheduled open air markets provide work opportunities for street vendors and cottage industries. The markets have become an affordable alternative source of merchandise for many Curitiba residents who can't afford shopping center prices. The integration of land-use policy with transit services supports a level of rider-ship that makes the transit system profitable. Profitability has made it possible for Curitiba to operate the transit system in partnership with private bus owners. Today, there are nine private operators in Curitiba covering 256 routes. The city has established a quasi-public transit corporation which establishes routes, sets fares, maintains terminals, and monitors performance. The bus system, which operates with no direct subsidy from city government, serves more than 1.3 million passengers daily, 50 times more people than 20 years ago. Questions
The situation This case is an example of the failure of a government's approach to land allocation and management and the capacity for creativity of people in the urban milieu when faced with the enormous task of satisfying their basic needs for food, energy, housing and meaningful employment. Los Belvederes is a group of thirteen contiguous, low-income settlements, illegally formed in Ajusco, a mountainous and wooded area on Mexico City's southwestern fringe. Ajusco lies within an ecological reserve which was planned by the Mexican government as a buffer against urban expansion. The Los Belvederes settlements, home to several thousand families, are an outgrowth of Mexico City's rural-urban migration which continues despite extremely difficult physical and social conditions. The thirteen settlements are classified as "irregular" by the Mexican government since none of the residents actually holds title to the lands on which they are living. Early in the 1980s, the government planned to eradicate the thirteen irregular settlements of Los Belvederes. This action was to be taken pursuant to the government's "politics of containment" that spells out explicitly the boundaries of the conservation area and the various measures to be taken by the government to enforce them. The magnitude of the situation made it practically impossible. Several thousand families were involved and there emerged a strong, organized, and innovative community group resistance movement. The Mexican government's approach to land allocation and management was the result of several conditions. Millions of Mexico City inhabitants are forced to live under very difficult physical and social conditions. The city continues to attract investors and migrant workers despite efforts by the central government to decentralize development away from the capital city. Located in the Central Mexican Basin, Mexico City's contained ecosystem has become seriously degraded by urban growth, toxic emissions from industry and vehicles, extensive deforestation, and desiccation of its lakes. To make matters worse, the city is prone to thermal inversions and a dangerous lowering of the water table resulting in the sinking of central areas. After a generation of hyper-urban growth, unbuilt land in Mexico City is scarce and, as a result, actively contested among potential users. The government's response has been to subject property development to increasing state control to the point of eventually exercising control over everything within the Federal District. The prospect of eviction mobilized the inhabitants of Los Belvederes to challenge government plans for the Ajusco. Several popular groups (collectively called the Front), with help from outside the zone, began to innovate social ecology projects as alternative strategies for urban development. The intent was to repudiate government plans to eradicate their settlements. Members of the Front proposed an integrated approach to urban development based on production that is "socially necessary, ecologically sound, and economically viable." This, they argued, was in sharp contrast to the government's centralized approach to planning which treated housing, economic and ecological problems as separate issues. Further steps for developing the settlement were taken in 1984 with the presentation of a proposal to the government for the transformation of one of the settlements (Bosques del Pedregal) into a productive ecological settlement, or colonia ecologica productiva (CEP). The CEP was an ambitious attempt to integrate within the territorial framework of the local community the need for residential space, employment, food production, and cultural and political self-determination. As the intensity of grassroots ecopolitics reached a peak in late 1984, the government announced that the provisions of the Ajusco Conservation Programme calling for massive relocation of households would be revoked. In other words, all of Los Belvederes would be included in the legally designated urban area, and every family would be given security of tenure on an individual basis. This sudden shift in state policy changed the terms of the struggle dramatically. Having the settlements incorporated into the legally designated urban area reduced the settler's insecurity and sense of urgency. With the "war" won, there was little energy among the settlers for lesser battles (e.g., continuance of the CEP campaign, other ecological initiatives, social experimentation and the multi-class and multi-sector alliances which had been forged locally and all over central Mexico by the movement). And with the energy gone from the movement, the state has lost a valuable learning opportunity about local initiatives to create sustainable livelihoods at a time when its approach to land allocation and management have proven clearly inadequate. Questions
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